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Abstract
We present a model of optimal monitoring expenditures. For any technology that yields a
conventional “S-shaped” production function for monitoring, the optimal level of monitoring
is shown to be higher in medium-sized ﬁrms than in both small and large ﬁrms. Further, the
interaction between specialization and agency are shown to lead to an “S-shaped” production
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11 Introduction
Previous studies assume that larger ﬁrms are more diﬃcult to monitor than ﬁrms of smaller size
(Stigler [4], Garen [2]). As a result, large ﬁrms have to pay higher eﬃciency wages (Stigler [4] and
Brown and Medoﬀ [1])). However, if the production of monitoring is similar to the production
of any other product, then the beneﬁt of specialization may lead to easier monitoring in large
ﬁrms. This paper explores this possibility and characterizes the relation between ﬁrm size and
monitoring.
2 Firm Size and Monitoring
A ﬁrm has N employees, n of whom are allocated to production (hereafter referred to as workers)
and the rest, m = N ¡ n, are allocated to monitoring the employees in production (hereafter
referred to as monitors). We refer to N as the ﬁrm size and m as the size of the monitoring
team. Only one good is produced by the ﬁrm and the output U is determined by the monitoring
level p and the number of the workers as U = (N ¡ m)u(p), where u(p) is the output of
each employee. The monitoring technology is such that p = ˜ p(m;N) =
G(m)
N¡m, where G(m) is
the amount of “monitoring,” an intermediate product produced by the m monitors. The ﬁrm
owner’s optimization problem is thus:





Proposition 1 states suﬃcient conditions for larger ﬁrms to devote more resources to monitoring.
Proposition 1 Let m¤(N) be the optimal solution to optimization problem (1). Then, dm
¤
dN > 0
if the monitoring technology and production technology are such that D1˜ p > 0, u0(p) > 0,
u00(p) < 0, and the solution to Problem (1) is regular and interior.3.
Proof : The ﬁrst-order-condition for the optimization problem maxm U(m;N) is
˜ J(m;N) ´ D1U
3The solution m
¤ is regular and interior if and only if m
¤ 2 (0;N) and
d2U
dm2 < 0.
2= ¡u + (N ¡ m)u0(N ¡ m)G0(m) + G(m)
(N ¡ m)2











(N ¡ m)D1 ˜ J(m;N)
:
The proposition then follows.
Proposition 2 states that the relation between monitoring level and ﬁrm size is determined
by the sign of G00(m). Hence, any monitoring production function that is not increasing and
concave over the whole domain provides a counter example to the conventional belief that large
ﬁrms tend to have lower monitoring level. For instance, if G(m) is ‘S-shaped,’ as usually assumed
for production functions, then the relation between the optimal monitoring level and the ﬁrm
size is non-monotonic.
Proposition 2 Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 1, the relation between the op-
timal monitoring level p¤ and the ﬁrm size N is completely determined by the sign of the second




is the same as that of G00(m).












The proposition then follows from the second order condition of problem (1), namely that
D1 ˜ J(m;N) < 0.
3 “S-shaped” Production Function of Monitoring
This section shows how the interaction between specialization and agency induces an “S-shaped”
production function for monitoring. Assume each worker has to accomplish tasks in the interval
3[0,1]. Monitors are located in the “task-space” as follows: The ith monitor is located at 2i¡1
2m ;i =





. The monitors detect unsatisfactory performance in
the interval of tasks. The probability that delinquency at task ˜ s is detected by a monitor located
at 1
2m is decreasing in the distance between the location of the monitor and the task, s = j˜ s¡ 1
2mj.
Further, assume that the probability of detection equals to 1 when the distance is zero. Denote
the probability of detecting delinquency during monitoring when the monitor exerts unity eﬀort
by h(s); hence, h0(s) < 0, and h(0) = 1. The expected probability of any delinquency being
caught by a monitor with unity eﬀort level is, therefore, H(m) = 2m
R 1
2m
0 h(s)ds. It can be
shown that H(m) is increasing in m as implied by the increasing returns in specialization.
The monitors themselves are monitored by the single ﬁrm owner. The probability a monitor
who exerts an eﬀort level lower than required is punished is thus 1
m. The monitor’s utility from
exerting eﬀort level of e is denoted ¡f(e), where f0(e) > 0 and f00(e) > 0. The most severe
penalty the ﬁrm can impose on the monitor is K, where K > 0 is exogenous and is expressed
in terms of utility of the monitors. Denote by e¤ the level of eﬀort the monitor chooses to
implement. The incentive-compatibility condition requires that ¡f(e¤) ¸ ¡ 1
mK ¡ f(e), for all
e < e¤. Hence, e¤ = e(m) = f¡1(K
m). It can be shown that e0(m) < 0. In other words, the
eﬀort level chosen by the monitors is inversely related to the number of monitors due to the
agency problem between monitors and the owner. Consequently, the expected probability of
any delinquency being detected when monitored, º, is given as º = e(m)H(m) = f¡1(K
m)H(m).
The monitoring level (the probability of any delinquency being monitored AND detected), p, is
then p = m
N¡mº, where m
n = m
N¡m gives the probability by which a worker is monitored. The
term m
N¡m is the monitoring intensity, while º is the monitoring eﬀectiveness, since it gives how
eﬀective each unit of monitoring intensity is in improving monitoring level.4
The production function generated in this model of monitoring is G(m) = mH(m)e(m)),
where m reﬂects the complementarities between monitoring and production, H(m) represents
4In previous models on monitoring, these concepts have not been distinguished from one another. For instance,
Neal [3] uses the frequency of supervision as a proxy for the monitoring level, although it seems to be a proxy for
monitoring intensity.
4the beneﬁt from specialization in monitoring, and e(m) accounts for the agency costs. Under
some fairly general conditions, the interaction between H(m) and e(m) provides an “S-shaped”
production function G(m), as usually assumed in economics.5
4 Discussion
Our results relating size and monitoring contrast with the conventional view in economics which
does not consider the beneﬁts from specialization in monitoring. Adam Smith viewed specializa-
tion as the most crucial contributing factor to productivity growth because ﬁner specialization
enables workers to develop skills within a narrower range and hence helps increase productivity.
But the extent to which we can beneﬁt from specialization is limited by the size and the scope
of the market, according to Smith. In the model presented in this paper, a diﬀerent factor limits
the extent of specialization, where the beneﬁt from specialization is constrained by the agency
problem between monitors and ﬁrm owner.
5The speciﬁc conditions and the proof are available from the authors. As an example, consider the following
technology: h(s) =
1
(k0s+1)2 for s ¸ 0 and f(e) =
K0e
K0¡e for e 2 [0;K0], where K0 > 0 is some physical constraint
faced by the individual monitor, for instance, health condition, and k0 > 0 gives information on how important
specialization is in monitoring.
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